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ABSTRACT 
 
The study was conducted due to high incidence of non-compliance by fishers in Central Java fisheries. 
The overall objective of the study is to examine the compliance behavior of fishers in Pemalang 
Regency. Eighty-five (n=85) respondents have been selected from the study areas using multi-stages 
sampling method. Moreover, key-persons from Fisheries Office, Navy and head of fishers’ association 
have also been interviewed  to enrich the analysis of the study. Non-compliance behaviour of fishers in 
this study was viewed from violation of: restricted area (zoning), restricted gears and means (explosive 
and poison) and administration (such as permits). Model of non-compliance behavior as outlined by 
Kuperan (1993) and Susilowati (1998) has been applied to analyze the data in this study with necessary 
modification. Tobit model explained by Gujarati (2003) was employed as the estimation techniques.  
 Most of independent variables such as demographical factors, fishing effort, deterrence 
indicators and legitimacy variables have expected signs although statistically are not always 
significant. In general, the model of non-compliance behaviour could portrait the phenomena of 
violation behaviour of fishers in the study area.  It is realized that  law enforcement in Indonesian 
fisheries is weak  for several reasons. Therefore, to improve the fishers’ compliance perhaps an 
alternative approach such as empowering the people and its stakeholders should be found. 
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1 A portion  of  research umbrella on Evaluation of Compliance Behavior of Fishers In The Communities With 
Different Level of Participation In Co-Management Processes (Cmps): A Case Study In Central Java Fisheries. It 
was  presented in the the 6th Asian Fisheries Forum, at the National Sun Yat Sen University, Kaohsiung-Taiwan,  
25-30 November 2001. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Marine fisheries in Indonesia are almost 
exclusively small-scale fisheries. To 
protect the small-scale fishers from unfair 
competition with large-scale operators, the 
government introduced several regulations 
to manage the Indonesian fisheries. The 
first evidence of official concern came in 
1973 when the Minister of Agriculture 
issued decree 561 calling for the “rational” 
exploitation of fisheries resources. 
Subsequently, in 1974, the Minister of 
Agriculture issued Decree No. 40, which 
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stated that trawler by catch device must be 
fully utilized rather than cast overboard. In 
1976, the authority expanded the 
regulatory measures by issuing Ministerial 
Decree No. 607 to establish a series of 
parallel coastal zones commencing 3 miles, 
4 miles, and 5 miles from the shore line 
and its subsequent layer to the shore. This 
regulation then was amended by Decree 
No.392/Kpts/LK.120/4/99.  The rationale 
for imposing these zones strongly 
suggested that the Decree was issued as a 
means of controlling large-scale gears 
operation. The main purpose of the zoning 
regulation among others is for resource 
conservation and protection of  the small-
scale fishers. The zoning regulation is 
expected to ensure the sustainability of 
inshore waters  environment which serve 
as breeding and nursery grounds for fish. 
The implementation of these 
regulations inevitably requires an effective 
enforcement and controlling mechanism. 
In fact, enforcement in Indonesia and 
particularly for the fisheries of Central 
Central Java is weak in operation. This 
could adverse the voluntarily compliance 
of fishers in the region.  Many incidences 
of non-compliance by fishers were found 
in Indonesia including in the Java Sea  
(Susilowati, 1998).  
 
 
 
PROBLEMS 
 
The non-compliance behavior could be 
explained by tight competition among the 
resource users in harvesting the saturated 
fisheries in Indonesia (Forum, 1996 and 
Gatra, 1996),  particularly nearby Java 
Island. Lack of institutional effectiveness, 
social pressure and moral degradation  are 
worsen  due to the down turn of economic 
and political situation in Indonesia. 
Securing compliance with regulations is a 
much more difficult task. Fishers may also 
be driven to violate due to multi-
dimensional motives and such a contextual 
situation they are in. It should be noted that 
compliance is necessary for successful 
management of the fisheries. But  to secure 
compliance need enforcement and 
surveillance which is quite costly (Sutinen, 
1987 and 1996). 
Given such background, the 
research problem is how to secure 
compliance with limited enforcement 
resources like Indonesia with special 
reference to Pemalang, Central Java 
fisheries. Thereafter, several research 
questions need to be answered by the study  
are: (1) How is the voluntarily compliance 
behavior of fishers in the study area?;  (2) 
How can the violation behavior of the 
fishers be effectively modeled?; (3) What 
policy recommendations should be offered 
to improve compliance level of the 
fishers?. Unfortunately, very little research 
has been done to explore non-compliance 
behavior of fishers in Asia and Africa. The 
only studies conducted in Asia are by 
Kuperan (1993) and Susilowati (1998). 
Therefore, it is timely to conduct the study 
on intensity of compliance behavior of  
fishers in Pemalang Regency. 
 
 
 
MATERIALS AND METHOD 
 
In general, the study is aimed to examine 
the compliance behavior of fishers in 
Pemalang Regency, Central Java-
Indonesia. While, the specific objectives 
are as follows: 
(1) To describe the profiles of  
respondents in the study area, 
(2) To develop a model of  voluntarily 
non-compliance behavior of fishers in 
the study area; 
(3) To examine factors affecting non-
compliance behavior of the fishers in 
the study areas, 
(4) To provide policy recommendations 
for improving compliance behavior of 
fishers in the study area. 
 
The theoretical framework of the study is 
depicted in Figure 1. 
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Fig. 1.   The Theoretical Framework 
 
 
The respondents were withdrawn 
with multi-stages sampling method and the 
sample distribution is summarized as 
follows. 
 
Table 1.  Sample Distribution
1/ 
 
Scale
2/
 Sample (n) 
 Small-scale 39 persons 
 Large-scale 46 persons 
 Total 85 persons 
Note: 
1/ Location: Pemalang, Central Java (West 
coast of Central Java Province). 
2/ Classification of fisheries scale is based 
on the discussion with the Fisheries 
Officer.  Small-scale if HP  20 and 
large-scale if HP  20. 
 The model of non-compliance 
behavior as outlined by Kuperan (1993) 
and Susilowati (1998) has been applied to 
analyze the data in this study with 
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necessary modification.  Tobit model as 
defined by Gujarati (2003) has been  
employed as the estimation technique in 
the study and is formulated as follows. 
NONCOMP = f  (Deterrence, Econ, 
Psycho, Pertviol,  Legitimacy, Fishing 
Effort, Demographical Factors).       
Definition of  the operational variables is 
shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Definition and Measurement of  the Operational Variables 
 
Variable Code Definition Measurement 
Dependent Variable  
Non-
Compliance 
NONCOMP Non-compliance decision of fishers 
to fish either in prohibited zone, 
using restricted gear and/or means,  
lack of administration conditions.  
- Intensity = frequency of 
violation for the respective 
restrictions or rules 
Independent Variables 
Age AGE *) Age of respondent. In numerical value (years)  
Numbers of 
family 
members 
TFAM *) Numbers of family members under 
the responsibility of respondent. 
In numerical value 
(persons)  
Work 
experience 
LONG *) The length of respondents’ work 
experience being a fisher. 
In numerical value (years)  
Horse power HP Capacity of boat engine as a proxy 
of fishing effort. 
In numerical value (HP)  
Deterrence DDETECT 
DREMIND 
DREPORT 
DOBSERV 
DCAUGHT 
Detection and conviction as a proxy 
of enforcement availability. 
DDETECT, DREMIND, 
DREPORT, DOBSERV, 
DCAUGHT are chance for being 
detected, reminded, reported, 
observed and caught, respectively. 
In Likert scale
1/ 
(MI) 
 
Economic 
opportunity 
 
SEAKG Economic opportunity or values 
earned by fisher from violating the 
observed regulation. 
In numerical value (kg)  
Moral 
development 
PSYCHO Psychological indicators of the 
moral development of individual 
fisher. 
In Likert scale 
1/
 
(MI) 
Social- 
environment 
PERTVIOL Social environment influences 
towards the violation of individual 
fisher. 
In numerical value (%) 
 Legitimacy 
2/
 LEGITIM Outcome and process variables 
represent legitimacy accorded by 
the individual fisher to the rule or 
regulations or legal authorities. The 
variables used by Kuperan (1993) 
and Susilowati (1998) are adopted 
with modification and enhancement. 
In Conventional scale 
(1 to 10) 
3/
 
(MI) 
 
Notes: 
1/  It has been consulted with the competent panels such as religion and community  leaders. 
2/  Detail component of the legitimacy variables was determined after pre-survey. 
3/  It is explored with in-depth interview. 
MI: it is measured from several items. 
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In Indonesia, conventional scale (1 to 10) 
is more widely used by people as 
evaluation scale measurement.  
*) Demographical factors. 
 The rational choice theory as 
argued by Becker (1968) could influence 
the decision made by the individual fisher. 
The propensity of individual fisher to 
engage in non-compliance activities (such 
as violate the rules or regulation or 
restrictions) may be guided by the ratio 
between benefit and its cost. Whenever the 
benefit is greater than its cost, a person 
will tend to engage with such activities 
although in illegal ways. The intensity of 
violation committed by individual fisher is 
usually estimated by Tobit model. This 
model is also known as a censored 
regression model. Some authors called 
such model with a Limited Dependent 
Variable (LIMDEP) model because of the 
restriction to put on the value taken by the 
regressand (Gujarati, 2003; and McFadden, 
1973)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Profiles of Respondents 
 
Many  respondents (76.5 percent) are 
young fishers with age between 21 to 40 
years old  and the age  average of 31 years. 
Most of them hold elementary school (89.4 
percent) with work experience in fisheries 
sector for about 15.6 years. The average 
boat tonnage used is about 12 GT, 
employing engine power of 68.7 HP (in 
average)  with about 7  crew members  per 
boat.  
The types of gear operated are 
mostly  cantrang (seiners) and kantong 
(bag net) but many other gears are also 
used by fishers for rotation purposes. The 
details of socio-economic respondents’ 
profile is shown in Appendix 1. 
 
Model  of  Violation Behavior 
 
The non-compliance evidence from zoning 
regulation in the fisheries of Indonesia is 
relatively high (Susilowati, 1998). The 
condition is adverse due to the downturn 
economic situation like nowadays. The 
statistics of violation intensity committed 
by respondents in this study is shown in 
Table 4. The average numbers of violation 
frequency engaged by respondents is about 
71 times in the last six months. Most 
respondents violated the regulations about 
1 to 100 times in the last six months. 
 
Table 3.  Intensity of Violation 
1/
 Respondents in the Last Six Months 
 
Description (times) Frequency Percentage Cum. % 
    1 - 50 22  25.9  40.7 
    51 - 100 26  30.6  88.9 
    101 - 150   3    3.5  94.4 
    151 - 200   2    2.4  98.1 
    201 - 250   1    1.2 100.0 
    Sub total 54  63.5  
    No reply 31  36.5  
    Total  85 100.0  
    Average  71 
1/
 Violations are either on gears, zoning, means used, and permits. 
Source: Primary data, processed. 
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 Tobit model is used to estimate the 
intensity of violation engaged by fishers. 
There are three scenarios of estimation 
outlined in the study as shown in Table 4, 
namely: 
- Scenario #1: Economic model 
- Scenario #2: Economic and Psycho 
model 
- Scenario #3: Economic, Psycho and 
Social model 
 
All  variables in the model show 
its consistency in the signs in all scenarios. 
None of demographic variables (Age, 
number of family members and length of 
work experience) are significant, however 
the magnitude of its signs remain able to 
explain the empirical phenomena. It seems 
more mature in age, fishers tend to be 
more conservative for not engaging with 
illegal activities such as violation. 
Fishers who have more family 
members also tend to behave least in non-
compliance activities. This situation is 
reflected by  the positive sign of variable 
TFAM. Respondents look more careful in 
working, perhaps in order to maintain their 
reputation, although actually respondents 
are potentially able to engage with 
violation activities given more work 
experience. This trend is  in line with the 
positive sign of variable LONG. 
The most important factor which 
determines the intensity of violation 
committed by fishers in the study area is 
fishing effort,  hence it was proxied by 
horse power (HP) variable. The HP 
variable is statistically significant at 
alpha=1% in all scenarios. This implies 
that higher use in horse power capacity 
will push fishers to commit violation. 
The deterrence indicators such as 
chance to be detected, observed and caught 
by the enforcement officers have an 
expected sign (negative) although 
statistically remain not significant. Perhaps 
fishers will hesitate to do illegal activities 
whenever their activities are detected, 
observed and in worse  caught by 
enforcement fleets. 
Economic factor (proxied by catch 
gained by fisher) showed unexpected in 
sign. Normally, a good catch will motivate 
fishers to engage more violation but in 
fact, fishers in the study area are not to do 
so. In some extents, violation maybe can 
not be viewed only from economic motive 
rather than from many dimensional 
motives came together. 
The variables of psychology which 
represent the moral development 
(Kohlberg, 1981 and 1984) of fisher and 
the variable of social-environment 
influence (PERTVIOL) in all scenarios 
have unexpected sign and are not 
significant at all. This can be interpreted 
that these variables failed to guide fisher in 
determining the violation intensity. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of violation 
intensity is compensated by the expected 
sign of the legitimacy variable (i.e. 
negative)  although it is not significant. It 
is believed that when a fisher is granted a 
higher legitimacy, it  is a good start to 
direct them for better achievement of 
compliance level. 
 
Table 4.  Tobit Estimation of Violation Intensity of Fishers in Pemalang Regency 
 
 
Variable 
  ECON: 
  Coefficient 
  (t-ratio) 
  ECON+PSY: 
  Coefficient 
  (t-ratio) 
 EC+PSY+SOC: 
  Coefficient 
  (t-ratio) 
  AGE 1/   -0.26496 
  (-0.22623) 
  -0.20723 
  (-0.17361) 
  -0.27294 
  (-0.23270) 
  TFAM 1/   -6.0908 
  (-1.1999) 
  -6.2383 
  (-1.2203) 
  -5.9905 
  (-1.1927) 
  LONG 1/   0.82042   0.77264   0.47933 
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Variable 
  ECON: 
  Coefficient 
  (t-ratio) 
  ECON+PSY: 
  Coefficient 
  (t-ratio) 
 EC+PSY+SOC: 
  Coefficient 
  (t-ratio) 
  (0.69945)   (0.65072)   (0.40687) 
  HP   0.54236 
  (3.0991****) 
  0.54563 
  (3.1078****) 
  0.45265 
  (2.3468***) 
  DDETECT 2/   -6.9524 
  (-0.27635) 
  -7.6585 
  (-0.30277) 
  13.090 
  (-0.51346) 
  DREMIND 2/   22.048 
  (0.97887) 
  24.148 
  (1.0013) 
  23.619 
  (0.99563) 
  DREPORT 2/   45.945 
  (1.2458) 
  44.270 
  (1.1830) 
  43.871 
  (1.1847) 
  DOBSERV 2/   -1.8419 
  (-0.043187) 
  -2.2660 
  (-0.053153) 
  -5.8293 
  (-0.13869) 
  DCAUGHT 2/   -77.891 
  (-1.1119) 
  -74.653 
  (-1.0496) 
  -63.669 
  (-0.90421) 
  SEAKG 3/   -0.039812 
  (-3.7552#) 
  -0.040062 
  (-3.7549#) 
  -0.039686 
  (-3.8081#) 
  PSYCHO    0.69186 
  (0.24481) 
  0.86323 
  (0.30991) 
  PERTVIOL     -430.90 
  (-0.000063) 
  LEGITIM     -0.59546 
  (-0.70249) 
  CONSTANT   38.447 
  (1.2919) 
  11.212 
  (0.097524) 
  488.74 
  (0.000071) 
  FREQ   (9.7927****)   (9.7859****)   (9.7980****) 
   Log-likelihood function   -311.59276   -311.56280   -310.06873 
 
Note: Dependent variable: FREQ 
1/ Demographical factors; 2/  Deterrence factors; 3/ Economic factor 
     **** : significant at 1% level.  *       : significant at 10% level 
     ***   : significant at 2% level  #       : significant but incorrect sign 
     **     : significant at 5% level 
 
 
Solutions for Compliance Impro-
vement 
 
Respondents in Pemalang  have  high  
propensity for being non-comply (see 
Table 3). More or less fishers in the study 
area have non-compliance rate over than 
70 percent as agreed by 40 percent of 
respondents in Pemalang. The figures  for 
non-compliance of other fishers as 
perceived by respondents is shown in 
Table 5.  
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Table 5.  Percentage of Non-Compliance of Other Fishers as Perceived by Respondents 
 
Description (%) Frequency Percentage 
      50 30  35.3 
    51  -  70 16  18.8 
    71  -  100 34  40.0 
    Sub total 80  94.1 
    No reply   5    5.9 
    Total 85 100.0 
    Averaged 62.8 
 
Source: Primary data, processed. 
 
 In this study, respondents were asked why they intended to violate the regulations and 
their  reasons are listed in the following table. 
 
Table 6.  Reasons of Violation  as Perceived by Respondents 
 
Description Frequency Percentage 
    No reply 53  62.4 
    The gears are cheap   2    2.4 
    Boundary are not clearly defined   1    1.2 
    The other nets are not productive   3    3.5 
    Easy to operate 10  11.8 
    Maintenance is easy    1    1.2 
    No sanction   4    4.7 
    No body violate   5    5.9 
    Prohibited gears operate only during off season   6    7.1 
    Total 85 100.0 
 
Source: Primary data, processed. 
 
Most respondents  in Pemalang 
confessed that they employ trawl to harvest 
fish because trawl is the most efficient 
gear, easy in operation, least in operational 
cost but provides very productive catch. 
The other salient reasons raised by 
respondents why fishers do violate the 
regulations or restrictions are because: (1) 
no boundary is clearly defined, thus 
difficult  for fishers to determine the 
prohibited area; (2) they do not have 
alternative job outside fisheries; (3) they 
do not have a better gear (prospective 
nets); (4) there is no strict deterrence 
sanction imposed to the violator; (5) 
people trust only to the legitimate 
government.   
These reasons of violation perhaps 
can be considered as the important input 
for compliance betterment since these 
opinions were taken  from the “actor” of 
violation. Several efforts which should be 
formulated for alleviation of the offences 
committed by fishers include: (1) 
enforcement officers must strict, (2) fair 
action (penalty and sanction) for the 
violators, especially to the large-scale and/ 
or foreign boat, (3) integrated surveillance 
and enforcement schemes, (4) to find the 
productive gears with cheaper operational 
cost but environmentally friendly, and (5) 
proper and fit management schemes. The 
detail suggestions as suggested by 
respondents to improve compliance are 
summarized in Table 7. 
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Table 7.  Suggestions to Alleviate the Non-Compliance of Fishers 
 
Description Frequency Percentage 
    No reply 63  74.1 
    Officers must strict   2   2.4 
    Negotiable   2    2.4 
    Need awareness among the stakeholders   1    1.2 
    Need extension   1    1.2 
    Strict rules   4    4.7 
    Need integrated surveillance   4    4.7 
    Good understanding among fishers   1    1.2 
    Strict sanction   3    3.5 
    Total 85 100.0 
 
Source: Primary data, processed. 
  
About three-fourth (74.1%) of respondents 
provided no reply answer (missing 
variable) to response the suggestions for 
alleviating non-compliance activities. This 
group of respondents could be included 
either as the potential violators group 
(since usually difficult for people to 
confess them-self as violators) or as the 
risk-averse group who behaved 
indifferently or ignorant (do not want to 
advise others because they might engage to 
the illegal activities. Therefore, they felt 
not eligible to speak-out  for some advices 
about violation). Compliance is however 
necessary for successful management of 
the fisheries. The challenge is how to 
secure compliance as efficient  as possible. 
In fact, enforcement is often linked with 
securing compliance. Traditionally, high 
level of enforcement or deterrence will 
result in a high compliance level. But, 
enforcement is costly and the authorities 
tend to face declining budgets. Therefore, 
the alternative ways for securing 
compliance of fishers, may include: (1) 
educating fishers with the actual 
information and current issues, including 
socialization of rules and/ or regulations; 
(2) creating diversification of income, 
especially from outside of the fisheries 
sector; (3) imposing  the deterred penalty 
and sanction to the violators; (4) 
conducting  integrated surveillance and 
enforcement system; (5) empowering 
social-religion leaders in propagating  for 
better compliance; (6) empowering the 
fisheries officers and the related authorities 
in order to develop work attitude of good 
and clean governance; and (7) introducing 
co-management approach as the alternative 
way to secure compliance.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Individual person has multi-dimensional 
motives and interests, thus to predict the 
compliance behavior of people is not just a 
simple task but must  rely on the normal 
situation and condition. Violation behavior 
tends to be influenced by the contextual 
situation and condition of the individual. 
This study concludes that the strategy to 
secure compliance for the certain target of 
people should be developed with unique 
design in order to fit with the situation they 
are in. In addition, fisheries management 
authorities should also explore alternative 
approaches for managing fisheries such as 
community-based or co-management 
approaches as suggested by several authors 
(Pomeroy et al., 1994; and Susilowati, 
2001). 
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APPENDIX 1 Profile of Respondents 
 
No Age (year) Freq. % 
1  Less than 21 8    9.4 
2  21 – 30 40  47.1 
3  31 – 40 25  29.4 
4  41 – 50 11  12.9 
5  More than 50 1    1.2 
  Averaged 31.1 
 Total 85 100.0 
No Length (year) Freq. % 
   7    8.2 
2  6 – 10 28  32.9 
3  11 – 15 17  20.0 
4  16 – 20 14  16.5 
5  More than 20 19  22.3 
  Averaged 15.6 
 Total 85 100.0 
No Education Freq. % 
2  Elementary School 76  89.4 
3  Junior High School   9  10.6 
4  Senior High School - - 
 Total 85 100.0 
No Tonnage Freq. % 
  51 60.0 
2  11 – 20 22 25.9 
3  21 – 30  9 10.6 
4  31 – 40  3   3.5 
5  More than 40   
  Averaged 12.1 
 Total 85 100.0 
No Horse Power Freq. % 
2  11 – 20  8   9.4 
3  21 – 30 10  11.8 
4  31 – 40 10  11.8 
5  41 – 50 20  23.5 
6  51 – 100  4   4.7 
7  101 – 150 25  29.4 
8  151 – 200  8   9.4 
9  More than 200   
  Averaged 68.7 
 Total 85 100.0 
No Number of Crews Freq. % 
1  Less than 6 66  77.6 
2  6 – 10  3    3.5 
3  11 – 15   
4  16 – 20  8    9.4 
5  More than 20  7    8.2 
6  No reply  1    1.2 
  Averaged 7.1 
 Total 85 100.0 
No Gears Freq. % 
1  Arad/Cothok   7    8.3 
2  Cantrang 27  31.8 
3  Trammel Net   2    2.4 
4  Dogol   
5  Rawe   
6  Gilnet   4   4.7 
7  Kantong 13  15.3 
8  Kejer   7    8.2 
9  Nilon   5    5.9 
10  Payang   3    3.5 
11  Purse Seine 13  15.3 
12  Shrimp  4    4.7 
 Total 85 100.0 
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